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Summary and Conclusions
In the real industry project, which new technology and systems have blossomed and have been
codified, many problems and challenges regarding the application of international safety sys-
tems standard IEC 61508 in low demand and high demand have been encountered. For in-
stance, automatic train protection system (ATP) is argued to be both low demand system and
continuous mode system(Braband (2006)). A low demand blow-out preventer(BOP) system will
operate in high demand mode to withstand the well pressure for hours and weeks when it is ac-
tivated to full closure(Jin (2011)). In the real case, both reliability assessments for low and high
demand mode could be requested due to the vague and ambiguous statement of concepts and
definitions in the IEC standard. Current existing researches put main emphasis on low demand
systems, but addresses on high/continuous demand systems are few.
This master’s thesis which is written in co-operation with Aker Solutions aims at discussing
those problems confronted in IEC 61508 and summarizing the existing academic work, math-
ematical models as well as relevant industry guideline. By assuming the system will operate in
both low demand and high/continuous demand mode, Subsea High Integrity Pressure Protec-
tion System as a case example is used to illustrate the problems in the case study. Both proba-
bility of failure on demand (PFD) and probability of dangerous failure per hour (PFH) are cal-
culated by PDS1 method as the low and high/continuous demand mode reliability assessment.
The results from the case study in terms of SIL are found out to be inconsistent. This problem is
discussed and traced back to the general quantitative SIL allocation method in IEC 61508-5. The
thesis therefore attempts to develop a general consistent SIL range by carrying out SIL calibri-
ations with Matlab. New correction factor is calculated and a new proposed SIL table is given.
The decisions on following IEC 61508 SIL table is further argued. Both pros and cons of different
solutions are compared.
1A calculation method for safety systems developed by Sintef for the Norwegian offshore industry. Full name is
"reliability of computer based safety systems"
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The demand mode of operation for safety instrumented system (SIS) is often classified into low
demand and high/continuous1 demand of operation. It is not straight forward to discriminate
between low and high/continuous demand although some standards propose ways to discrim-
inate between these two modes of operation. For most SIS system, low demand has been as-
sumed, and research has put main emphasis on low demand systems. In recent years, more
attention has been paid to high/continuous demand systems, and several problems are encoun-
tered.
1.2 Literature survey
A systematic search for literature survey in the scientific databases (ScienceDirect, Compendex,
Web of Science, Google Scholar) is conducted in this thesis. The relevant articles are sorted and
selected thoroughly among a great amount of literature, more detailed literature survey is given
in Chapter 2.3 and Chapter 3.
The literature reviews aimed at conclude on the following main areas:
1When later stating high demand mode of operation in the thesis, continuous demand operation belongs to this
mode.
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• Existing scientific research works on high demand study and confronted challenges. (Chap-
ter 2.3)
• Relevant industrial works and guidelines. (Table 2.2)
• Existing mathematical models for low demand and high/continuous demand reliability
calculations. (Chapter 3)
1.3 Objective
The main objective of this Master’s thesis is to gain indepth insight into the relation between
high and low demand mode of operation.
To reach the main objective, sub-objectives are developed as below:
• Perform a literature review, and pay special attention to differences between high and low
demand mode of operation. Give a brief introduction to IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and the
OLF guideline OLF 070.
• Search for related work in other industries like the railway, nuclear and aviation industry.
• Present, and compare the main frameworks for reliability assessment and architectural
constraints for both high demand, and low demand mode of operation respectively.
• Perform a case study where both the high demand and low demand mode of operation is
used as basis for the approaches and discuss the results.
• Conclude on the approach both with respect to implications for standardization work,
and for the company. The discussion should cover both the issue of SIL allocation, and
reliability assessment.
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1.4 Approach
Theoretical framework and literature review are summarized to structure the knowledge back-
ground for the thesis. The PDS method provides the probability of failure on demand (PFD)
and probability of dangerous failure per hour (PFH) formulas for different voting configurations
(PDS (2013)). In case study in Chapter 4, the PDS method developed by SINTEF for the Norwe-
gian offshore industry is utilized as a calculation method. Based on the results and findings from
the case study, this SIL inconsistency is investigated. SIL calibration is carried out with Matlab.
The correction factor for IEC 61508 SIL table is calculated. The new SIL table consistency is later
tested and discussed.
1.5 Limitations
• High Integrity Pressure Protection System is a typical low demand system. In order to
compare results of different operation mode in the case study, HIPPS is assumed to be
able to operate in both low and high demand state.
• Adopting β factor model for the common cause failure has limitations, as it gives credit to
the degree of redundancy and the model assumes the same rate of common cause failures
no matter what the configurations are.
• Human factor is not considered in this analysis.
• Limitations in PDS method for HIPPS case study, since it cannot include the effect of pro-
cess demands and duration of demand-states.
• The failure probability contribution from other systematic failures and the contribution
from alternative testing mechanisms are not considered.
• Limited access/information to other relevant industry works.
• The pre study and status report is not included as part of this thesis in agreement with the
supervisor.
• Due to limited space, PDS method is used as the only mathmatical model for case study.
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The master’s thesis is structured as follows (Figure 1.1) :
• Chapter 1: Gives an introduction to the problem at hand and the objectives of the master
work.
• Chapter 2: Theoretical framework, which provides the necessary background information
to support the master work and for the reader. Literature review is included in this chapter
as well.
• Chapter 3: Mathematical models for low and high demand. This chapter identifies and
discusses the existing calculation models in literatures used in low and high demand cal-
culation.
• Chapter 4: Case study. Presents the case study of Subsea HIPPS system. PFD and PFH
calculation and comparison for low and high/continuous demand system are performed.
SIL calibration are carried out with Matlab.
• Chapter 5: Recommendations and conclusions for master’s thesis.
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the Master’s Thesis
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Standards and Guidelines
2.1.1 IEC 61508
When systems become complex, the safety and software in safety-related applications must be
proved and justified. An IEC (International Eletrotechnical Commission) standard is therefore
made to guide system designers and developers to achieve the safety requirements of the system
for the intended uses.
The international standard IEC 61508 is widely used for handling functional safety for safety
instrumented system. The standard consists of seven parts, previous four parts give the require-
ment of the standards and could be summarized as normative category. Part five to seven give
the example and guidelines and therefore is put into informative category.
Normative part:
• IEC 61508-1: General requirements, provides the global framework permitting functional
safety, covers general instructions, deals with all the life cycle phases.
• IEC 61508-2: Covers instructions relating to E/E/PE (Electrical/ Electronic/ Programmable
electronic) safety-related systems, particularly deals with the phase of producing these
systems.
• IEC 61508-3: Software requirements, dedicated to instructions relating to the software.
7
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• IEC 61508-4: Definitions and abbreviations, group together the main definitions and ab-
breviations used in the 7 volumes of the standard.
Informative part:
• IEC 61508-5: Examples of methods for determining levels of safety integrity, centered on
risk reduction.
• IEC 61508-6: Reference document for our research, provides the directive lines permitting
us to apply standard IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3.
• IEC 61508-7: Presents the techniques and measures which are likely to be used.
2.1.2 IEC 61511
The international standard IEC 61511 is a functional safety standard used for the process in-
dustry sector. It is developed by the same IEC 61508 committee and is entitled as "Functional
Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector". Safety instrumented sys-
tems are defined by IEC 61511 as including sensors, logic solvers and final elements. The stan-
dard also focuses on probabilistic evaluation of process risk, required risk reduction, safety life
cycle concept and a structured engineering process which ensures functional safety is achieved
in a plant. IEC 61511 is used by those who are managing, designing, implementing or operating
a safety instrumented system (SIS) application in a process or similar plant.
2.1.3 OLF 070
The guideline OLF(The Norwegian Oil Industry Association) 070 has been developed to support
the use of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. This OLF070 (2004) standard is a simplified application
of international standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 for the Norwegian petroleum industry and
provide. The guideline presents conservative minimum SIL requirements which takes the un-
certainty into consideration. The user therefore do not need to derive the SIL requirements,
since it has proven difficult to do that.
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2.2 Reliability theory
2.2.1 Safety Instrumented System
The SIS is the abbreviation of Safety Instrumented System. The safety instrumented systems
are designed to be responsible for the operating safety and ensuring the emergency shutdown
and widely used to prevent hazardous events. The safety instrumented system has two main
functions (Rausand and Høyland (2004)):
• The deviation is detected by sensors in SIS and the required actuating items are activated
and meet the intended functions when a predefined process demand occurs in the EUC
(Equipment under control). If this system function fails, it is called fail to function (FTF).
• Without the presence of predefined process demand occurs in the EUC (Equipment under
control), the SIS is not activated spuriously. A failure of this function is called a spurious
trip (ST).
Figure 2.1: Illustration of a Safety Instrumented System
The Safety Instrumented System can be used in proactive or reactive way as a safety bar-
rier. As a proactive barrier, it is used in continuously or rather frequently high demand systems
or certain infrequent process low demand systems to prevent and reduce the likelihood of the
event. The reactive barriers are mostly low demand systems which aim at stopping or mitigating
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the consequences of the event chain following a hazardous event (Liu (2011)). A typical consti-
tution of a safety instrumented system is composed of three subsystems(Figure 2.1):
• Subsystem S - One or more Sensors (Input elements) (e.g., Sensor transmitters)
• LS subsystem - One or more Logic Solvers (eg., Relay logic systems and programmable
logic controllers)
• FE subsystem - One or more Final Elements (eg., Safety valves and circuit breakers)
The process performance is detected by the sensor. The logic solver reads physical variables
(e.g., Temp, Pressure and Level etc.). If they exceed and remain at the set level, the logic solver
could activate the Final Element subsystem by carrying out decision making process. The FE
subsystem will keep the system in a safe state by acting directly (Emergency stop valves) or in-
directly (Solenoid valves) to stop the process.
2.2.2 Failure classification
Figure 2.2: Classification of failures
The international standard IEC61508 (2010) covers four types of failures based on physical
and nonphysical aspects:
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• Random hardware failures: Failure, occurring at a random time, which results from one
or more of the possible degradation mechanisms in the hardware(Figure 2.2).
– Aging failures
Failures occur under conditions within the design envelope of the item.
– Stress failures
Failures occur due to excessive stresses on the item.
• Systematic failures: Failure, related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can
only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the manufacturing process, oper-
ational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors(Figure 2.2).
– Design failures
Failures are initiated during engineering, manufacturing, or installation.
– Interaction failures
Failures are initiated by human errors during operation, maintenance or testing.
• Dependent failure: Failure whose probability cannot be expressed as the simple product
of the unconditional probabilities of the individual events that caused it.
• Common causes failures: A dependent failure in which two or more component fault
states exist simultaneously, or within a short time interval, and are a direct result of a
shared cause is defined as the common cause failure (Rausand and Høyland (2004)).
– CCF where the components fail simultaneously, commonly caused by external shocks
– CCF where the components fail within a larger interval of time, typical examples are
CCF due to humidity and vibration
Common cause failure causes the failure of more than one component in a multi-component
system and plays a significant role in the safety integrity. Typical root causes for CCF could be
shared environmental dust, humidity, fire, vibration, electromagnetic interference(EMI) (Stavri-
anidis (1992)). The common cause failures are assumed from random hardware failures and
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systematic failures in the systems. The random failures (hardware failures) and systematic fail-
ures are classified into dangerous failures and safe failures in IEC 61508. Dangerous failure and
Safe failure could further be classified into detected and undetected failures.
• Detected failure
In relation with hardware, detected by the diagnostic tests, proof tests, operator interven-
tion or through normal operation.
• Undetected failure
In relation with hardware, undetected by the diagnostic tests, proof tests, operator inter-
vention or through normal operation.
• Dangerous failure
Failure which has the potential to put the safety related system in a dangerous state or a
state where it cannot fulfil its function.
– Dangerous Detected (DD)
Dangerous failures that are detected immediately when they occur.
– Dangerous Undetected (DU)
Dangerous failures are preventing activation on demand and are revealed only by
testing or when a demand occurs.
• Safe failure
Failure which does not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a dangerous
state or a state where it cannot fulfil its function.
– Safe Detected (SD)
Non-dangerous failures that are detected by automatic self testing.
– Safe Undetected (SU)
Non-dangerous failures that are not detected by automatic self testing.
– No part failure
Failure of a component that plays no part in implementing the safety function.
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– No effect failure
Failure of an element that plays a part in implementing the safety function but has
no direct effect on the safety function.
2.2.3 Test interval
The definitions of diagnostic test interval and proof test interval are shown below:
• Diagnostic test interval: Interval between on-line test to detect faults in a safety-related
system that has a specified diagnostic coverage.
• Proof test interval: Periodic test performed to detect failures in a safety-related system
so that, if necessary, the system can be restored to an "as new" condition or as close as
practical to this condition.
Functional tests are performed to reveal DU failures at regular intervals before a demand
occurs. Diagnostic test is used to reveal certain types of failures by avoiding to fully operate
the main functions of the component. Functional test is important for low demand system to
detect and prevent hidden dangerous undetected failures. However, functional testing may not
be evident to high demand system. The interval in diagnostic test is very short (eg. few seconds,
minutes or hours) compared with functional test in most high demand systems. In low demand
system, there will usually be enough time to repair and restore the function before the next
occurrence of demand. It is assumed that EUC will be brought to the safe state immediately
by SIF when DD failure occurs. The contribution to PFH from dangerous detected failures in
diagnostic testing is therefore negligible (Mewcha (2009)).
Remark: However, Jin (2013) argues that contributions from dangerous detected failures should
be taken into consideration. Because DD failure may not be detected immediately, diagnostic
test interval isn’t always negligible. After DD failure being detected, it may not be realistic and
practicable to switch into the safe state immediately.
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2.2.4 Safety integrity
A SIS may perform one or more safety instrumented functions (SIFs) to achieve or maintain a
safe state for the system the SIS is protecting, with respect to a specific process demand (Rau-
sand and Høyland (2004)). In IEC 61508 safety integrity is defined as the "Probability of a safety
related system satisfactorily performing the required functions under all stated conditions within
a stated period of time." The safety integrity is used to measure the performance of the safety
function and can also be interpreted as reliability.
Three categories of safety integrity are distinguished in IEC61508 (2010):
• Hardware safety integrity
– Quantitative requirements
Probability of failure on demand for low demand system.
Probability of dangerous failure per hour for high and continuous demand system.
– Architectural constraints
• Software safety integrity(Qualitative requirements)
• Systematic safety integrity(Qualitative requirements)
The safety integrity level is a measure of the reliability of the safety function performing to
specification. It is defined as a relative level of the risk-reduction provided by a safety function,
or to specify a target level of risk reduction (AN9025 (2002)). The main principle in IEC 61508
is to provide the basic process control system without any particular safety measures. After the
calculation for risk without safety systems is performed. If the risk is higher than the accepted
criteria, SIL requirement is used to measure how much risk reduction is required. Four target
ranges of safety performance for the safety function have been specified in IEC 61508 for both
low demand and high demand. These levels of safety performance are Safety Integrity Levels
(SILs). The level of safety integrity increases from SIL 1 (Least reliable) to SIL 4 (Most reliable).
The higher the safety integrity level is, the more stringent the requirements become. Those
three categories of safety integrity described above must fit the specified safety integrity level
altogether to claim the safety instrumented function (SIF) meet the required SIL.
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2.2.5 Reliability measures
Two reliability measures for safety instrumented system for low demand and high demand mode
of operation are defined in IEC 61508. The average probability of failure on demand (PFD) is
used for quantification of the reliability of SISs operating in low demand mode. And the proba-
bility of dangerous failure per hour (PFH) is used as the reliability measure for high demand and
continuous SISs. Formulas for quantifying the PFD and PFH is given both in the PDS method
handbook, and in IEC 61508-6. Mathmatical models (eg. Fault Tree Model, Markov Model, Petri
Net Model) used in calculating those measures are described in Chapter 3.
For low demand system. Safety integrity levels target at failure measures for a safety function
operating in low demand mode of operation. This measure quantifies the safety unavailability
caused by random hardware failures. The probability that a SIF will fail to respond adequately
upon a demand is also denoted by the probability of failure on demand.
Figure 2.3: Safety integrity level for low demand operation. (Adapted from IEC61508 (2010))
R(t ) is the reliability function of the safety instrumented system. The formula for probability
of failure on demand is:
PF D = 1− 1
τ
∫ τ
0
R(t )d t (2.1)
The average probability of failure to perform its design function on demand for low demand
mode is presented in the column. Four safety integrity levels for low demand mode are shown
in Figure 2.3.
For high demand system. Safety integrity levels target at failure measures for a safety func-
tion operating in high demand mode of operation or continuous mode of operation.
The w(t ) is defined as the failure intensity. T is the time duration. Probability of dangerous
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Figure 2.4: Safety integrity level for high demand and continuous operation.(Adapted from
IEC61508 (2010))
failure per hour is calculated as below:
PF H(T )= 1
T
∫ T
0
w(t )d t (2.2)
The values of probability of dangerous failure per hour are stated in the column. Four safety
integrity levels for high or continuous demand mode are shown in Figure 2.4.
2.2.6 Safe failure fraction and architectural constraints
Additional requirement for hardware verification, besides PFD, PFH requirements, is called the
architectural constraints, which is a semi-quantitative requirement expressed in terms of the
safe failure fraction, system type (A or B) and hardware fault tolerance (HWFT). Safe failure
fraction (SFF) is defined as the ratio of the average rate of safe failures plus dangerous detected
failures of the subsystem to the total average failure rate of the subsystem(Innal. (2008)). The
definition of the total failure rate has differences in IEC 61508 and PDS handbook. The total fail-
ure rate in IEC 61508 is the sum of all failures, while PDS method limits the total failure rate to the
failures that will be critical for the system. Safe Failure Fraction can be calculated in IEC61508
(2010) using the following equation:
SF F =
∑
λSD +∑λSU +∑λDD∑
λSD +∑λSU +∑λDD +∑λDU (2.3)
Hardware fault tolerance is the number of failures that are tolerated before the loss of safety
function. Index N in hardware fault tolerance means that (N +1) faults could cause a loss of the
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safety function (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Architectural constraints of SIS in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511.
Two types of systems and safe failure fraction (SFF) are used in architectural constraints to
determine the safety integrity level. Type A systems are systems with low complexity. Type B
systems are complex systems, typically programmable units. A safety instrumented system can
be considered to be the type A (Table 2.1) if three requirements below are met (Innal. (2008)):
• The behaviour in the presence of faults is well determined
• The failure modes of its constituent parts are well defined
• The data on their failures from feedback is known with good reliability
Otherwise, safety instrumented system is considered to be type B .
Remark: The differences in architectural constraints for low and high demand mode are caused
mainly by SFF. As being discussed in Chapter 2.2.3 and Chapter 4.2, the dangerous detected
(DD) failure rate will in most cases not contribute to an increased SFF if there is no automatic
transition of the system to a safe state upon a DD failure. It is slightly different restrictions how
the SFF is calculated for high demand systems depending on the level of redundancy.
2.2.7 Low demand versus high demand
Demand state is defined as "State of the EUC when the safety-related system is being required to
implement a particular safety function(s)" (Y Misumi (1999)). IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 give dif-
ferent definitions for low demand, high demand and continuous demand. If the demand rate is
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greater than once per year or twice the frequency of functional test, according to IEC 61508, high
demand operation mode is used for safety instrumented system. In this mode, the dangerous
conditions are not always present as continuous mode, but happen frequently. The continu-
ous operation mode is used if the demand occur continuously and effectively always present.
In this mode, a dangerous situation will normally occur anytime the system fails dangerously
(both DU and DD). Otherwise, SIS is operating in low demand mode. Both definitions in the
IEC standards are listed below:
Current IEC61508 (2010) standard:
• Low demand mode is where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-
related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof-tests
frequency;
• High or continuous demand mode is where the frequency of demands for operation made
on a safety-related system is greater than one per year or greater than twice the proof-tests
frequency.
Current IEC61511 (2010) standard:
• Demand mode is where a specified action (eg, closing a valve) is taken in response to
process conditions or other demands; In the event of a dangerous failure of the safety
instrumented function a potential hazard only occurs when there is a failure in the process
or the basic process control system (BPCS);
• Continuous mode is where in the event of a dangerous failure of the safety instrumented
function a potential hazard will occur without further failure unless action is taken to pre-
vent it.
Three modes of operation(low demand, high demand and continuous demand) can be de-
fined and categorized by three time intervals (Demand Interval, Automatic Diagnostic Interval
and Manual Proof Test Interval). The relationships are shown in Figure 2.5.
Below are some of the typical low and high demand systems examples:
• Typical low demand systems are:
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Figure 2.5: SIF modes and Time Interval Relationships (Adapted from William M. Goble (2005))
– Emergency shutdown systems
– Fire and gas detection systems
– Process shutdown systems
– Airbag systems in automobiles
• Typical high demand systems are:
– Dynamic positioning (DP) systems for ships and offshore platforms
– Anti-lock braking systems (ABS) for automobiles
– Railway signaling systems
2.3 Relevant research works and industry guidelines
For most SIS system low demand has been assumed, and lots of researches have put main em-
phasis on low demand systems. The probability of failure on demand has already been dis-
cussed by several authors, extensive research has been carried out related to modeling and cal-
culation of the PFD in low demand mode (B. Knegtering (1999), Sato (2003) and Bukowski J V
(2002)). Comparison of different techniques was found in J.L Rouvroye (2002). In recent years
more attention has been paid to high demand systems, however, little information accept the
method presented in IEC 61508-6 has been found, lots of challenges and problems are con-
fronted in the high demand systems and PFH calculations. The PFD has been widely recog-
nized as its average unavailability. But the nature of the probability of failure per hour PFH is
not defined clearly in the IEC 61508 or in the general literature. Also its applicability confronts
significant disadvantages because the character of the statement of certain concepts and major
definitions in the IEC 61508 is sometimes vague and ambiguous (Signoret (2010)).
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No argument is found for using PFH calculation instead of PFD calculation if the number
of demands is above once per year. The demand of once per year or twice the frequency of
functional tests as the borderline is not well explained in IEC 61508 or anywhere else (Jin (2011)).
There is no further discussion on the distinction between low and high demand systems and
no exploits in the differences in reliability between the two categories (Liu (2011)). Serveral
problems related to PFH have also been discussed in PDS (2013). It is concluded that PF Ho 1 =
PF H is a sensible measure for system operated in continuous mode. However, PFH is constant,
independent of the demand rate, and so does not reveal how the risk depends on the demand
rate, therefore PF H0 alone is not suited as a measure for loss of safety for on demand systems
(neither in low demand nor high demand irrespective of τ andδ). The main contributor to PF H0
does not depend on the length of the test interval, τ. So the decrease in safety experienced by
increasing τ is essentially not captured by PF H0.
The necessities to use low and high demand system have been discussed by Jin (2011). The
disadvantages are such as unable to capture the combined effects of functional testing, spuri-
ous activations and successful responses to demands. A common approach by Markov model
to calculate HEF (Hazardous event frequency) for general demand modes covering both low
demand and high demand is forwarded. Liu (2011) explores the classification by studying the
SIS reliability for varying demand rates, demand durations, and test intervals. The approach is
based on Markov models and is exemplified by two simple system configurations. The PFD is
an adequate measure for the SIS reliability for low demand systems, but may be confusing and
difficult to interpret for high demand systems. Jin (2013) presents new PFH formulas for general
k-out-of-n-systems, that take into account both dangerous detected and dangerous undetected
failures, also allow for non-perfect proof-testing. Mathmatical models are summarized into two
categories(Formula approximation and State transition) in Chapter 3. Related industry guide-
line 2 are listed in Table 2.2.
1PF Ho is defined as the average rate of SIS failures. τ is the length of interval of functional testing. Demand rate
is defined as δ
2Few relavant industry works are found out, partly due to limited access to other industries. However, relevant
industry works on similar topic in this dissertation are as few as scientific research papers on high demand systems.
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Chapter 3
Mathematical models for low and high
demand calculation
In this chapter, mathematical models for low and high demand reliability calculation are sum-
marized as part of the literature review. The mathematical models for PFD and PFH calculation
can be concluded in three categories in general:
• By formula approximation:
– IEC standard and simplified calculation (IEC61508 (2010) Hauge S (2010))
– Fault tree model (IEC61508 (2010) Innal (2008) Signoret (2010))
– PDS method (PDS (2013) Jin (2013))
• By state transition model:
– Markov model(IEC61508 (2010) Bukowski (2006) Innal (2008) Signoret (2010) Liu (2011)
Y Misumi (1999) I. Yoshiamura (2009))
– Petri Net (IEC61508 (2010) Innal (2008) Signoret (2010))
• Common approach(Jin (2011) Braband (2006))
22
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3.1 IEC formula
The formulas in IEC 61508 are introduced in this section. The limitation is that the IEC-formulas
can only be applied to SIS subsystems with at most three elements. The channel equivalent
means down time is tC E . MRT and MTTR is the abbreviation for mean repair time and mean
time to restoration. More detailed explainations of each terms can be found in IEC61508 (2010).
tC E = λDU
λD
(
τ
2
+MRT )+ λDD
λD
MT T R (3.1)
System equivalent down time tGE is expressed as:
tGE = λDU
λD
· (τ
3
+MRT )+ λDD
λD
·MT T R (3.2)
The PFD formula for a single system presented in IEC 61508 is:
PF D = (λDU +λDD )tC E =λDU (τ
2
+MRT )+λDD MT T R (3.3)
For 1oo2 system, the formula is shown below:
PF D1oo2 = 2((1−βD )λDD + (1−β)λDU )2tC E tGE +βDλDD MT T R+βλDU (τ
2
+MRT ) (3.4)
The PFH formula for a single system presented in IEC 61508 is:
PF H(T )= 1
T
∫ T
0
w(t )d t = 1−exp[−
∫ T
0 Λ(t )d t ]
T
= F (T )
T
(3.5)
For a 1oo1 system the PFH is equal to the frequency of dangerous SIS failures:
PF H =λDU (3.6)
For 1oo2 system, the formula is shown below:
PF H1oo2 = 2((1−βD )λDD + (1−β)λDU )2tC E +βDλDD +βλDU (3.7)
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3.2 Fault tree analysis model
A fault tree method is used to model the failure of a certain TOP event which depends on other
basic physical components by AND- or OR- gate in a tree structure. In low demand mode, FTA
provides acceptable approximations of the PFD for SIS. For each basic event i, the PFDavg is
calculated in CARA Fault Tree by the approximation (Equation 3.10):
qi (t )≈
λDU ,iτi
2
(3.8)
A fault tree with m minimal cut sets can be modelled as a series structure of the m mini-
mal cut parallel structures. The probability of failure on demand for a minimal cut set j with
independent components can be expressed as1:
QMC j (t )≈
m j∏
i=1
qi (t ) (3.9)
The probability of failure on demand for low demand system can be approximated with a
conservative upper bound approximation:
Q0(t )≈ 1−
m∏
j=1
(1−QMC j (t )) (3.10)
The average probability of dangerous failures per hour PF H(t ) is defined as the uncondi-
tional failure intensity of the system which is also called the failure frequency or the failure den-
sity. PFH is obtained from fault tree by considering the components which are in working state.
This failure intensity is defined by:
wi (t )= lim
d t→0
Pr (t < T ≤ t +d t )
d t
(3.11)
Pr (t < T ≤ t +d t )∼=wi (t ) ·d t (3.12)
For each component Ci , the unconditional failure intensity wi (t ) can be calculated from
Equation 3.11. The conditional probabilities are p(S/ci ) and p(S/c¯i ) when we know that com-
1Formula 3.9 is non-conservative for simultaneous testing.
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ponent ci is failed or not failed respectively. The hazard rate of component ci is λi . Ai (t ) is
the instantaneous availability of component of ci which can be approximated as the reliability
of each component. For each of its components ci , unconditional failure intensity ws(t ) and
birnbaum importance factor IB (S,ci ) are calculated. Their respective products are then added
together. The average probability of dangerous failures per hour can be obtained from the sum
of the product of the Birnbaum’s measure of importance factor and the unconditional failure
intensity of each component (Signoret (2010)):
ωs(t )=
∑
i
IB (S,ci )ωi (t ) (3.13)
ws(t )=
∑
i
(p(S/ci )−p(S/c¯i )) ·λi Ai (t ) (3.14)
The PFH is then calculated by formula below:
PF H(T )= 1
T
∫ T
0
ws(t )d t (3.15)
3.3 Markov model
The markov model can be used to analyze and describe dynamic systems with the system states.
The system states in markov model can be categorized as:
• Functioning state,
• Non-functioning state
• System is operating in a degraded mode
Lots of researchers prefer not to distinguish the SIS modes and use a common reliability
measure with basis in markov modelling(Bukowski (2006) Innal (2008) Signoret (2010) Jin (2011)
Liu (2011) Y Misumi (1999) I. Yoshiamura (2009) Jin (2011)). It has been concluded that the
techniques that hold the greatest modeling poweer is the Markov analysis compare with the
different quantitative techniques(J.L Rouvroye (2002)). State transition diagram and transition
rate matrix A for the calculation of steady state, can be expressed by:
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A=

a00 a01 a02 · · · a0r
a10 a11 a12 · · · a1r
...
...
...
...
...
ar 0 ar 1 ar 2 · · · ar r
 (3.16)
PFD can be acquainted by solving the following set of equations:
r∑
j=0
∏
j = 1
∏
A= 0 (3.17)
The set of the critical working states is MC . Λi is the sum of the failure rates removing the
critical working state i and finishing in a failed state. The expression for the PF H(t ) is:
PF H(t )=ωs(t )=
∑
i∈Mc
Λi pi (t ) (3.18)
The average PF H(t ) over the period of T is directly deduced from Equation 3.18. C STi [0,T ]
and APSi [0,T ] denote respectively the cumulative sojourn time in the critical working state i
over the period T , and the average probability of sojourn in this state over the same period. It is
expressed as (Signoret (2010)):
PF H = 1
T
∫ T
0
(
∑
i∈Mc
Λi pi (t ))d t = 1
T
∑
i∈Mc
[Λi
∫ T
0
pi (t )d t ]= 1
T
∑
i∈Mc
Λi C STi [0,T ]=
∑
i∈Mc
Λi APSi [0,T ]
(3.19)
3.4 PDS method
The PDS is a calculation method for safety systems developed by Sintef for the Norwegian off-
shore industry. The full name for PDS is Reliability of computer based safety systems. It is
assumed as a general rule that random hardware failures are denoted as independent failures
while systematic failures may lead to CCFs. The PDS method provides the simplified PFD and
PFH formulas for different voting configurations (PDS (2013)). It gives more conservative relia-
bility assessment results and is easy to be used in reliability assessment of safety instrumented
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systems. The disadvantages of PDS have also been argued, since it cannot include the effect
of process demands and duration of demand-states, the failure probability contribution from
application software failures, other systematic failures and the contribution from alternative
testing mechanisms are not considered in the modeling approach as well. The β factor mod-
eling also exists weaknesses for the common cause failures, as it gives credit to the degree of
redundancy and the model assumes the same rate of common cause failures no matter what
the configurations are (Per Hokstad (2009)). CMooN factors for different voting logics are listed
in Figure 3.1.
The τ is the period between functional testing. λDU is the dangerous undetected failure. For
low demad mode calculation, probability of failure on demand for 1oo1 system can be expressed
below:
PF D1oo1 ≈λDU ·τ/2 (3.20)
For a duplicated module 1oo2 system, contribution of common cause failure for PFD is cal-
culated from the formula:
PF DCC F1oo2 ≈β · (λDU ·τ/2) (3.21)
PFD contribution from independent failure of 1oo2 system can be approximated by:
PF D i nd .1oo2 ≈ (λDU ·τ)2/3 (3.22)
Probability of failure on demand for a 1oo2 voted system is:
PF D1oo2 ≈β · (λDU ·τ/2)+ (λDU ·τ)2/3 (3.23)
In general, for components voted MooN system, contribution of CCF and independent fail-
ure for PFD is calculated from
PF DCC FMooN ≈CMooN ·β · (λDU ·τ/2); (M <N ) (3.24)
CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICALMODELS FOR LOW ANDHIGHDEMAND CALCULATION 28
PF D i nd .MooN ≈
N !
(N −M +2)! · (M −1)! · (λDU ·τ)
N−M+1; (M <N ) (3.25)
In high demad mode calculation, for 1oo1 system, the probability of dangerous failure per
hour is equal to dangerous undetected failure rate:
PF H1oo1 =λDU (3.26)
For a duplicated module 1oo2 system, the PFH considering common cause failure is:
PF HCC F1oo2 =βλDU (3.27)
Contribution from 1oo2 system, independent failures can be approximated by:
PF H i ndi vi dual1oo2 = (λDUτ)2/τ=λ2DUτ (3.28)
Probability of dangerous failure per hour for 1oo2 system is
PF H1oo2 =βλDU + (λDUτ)2/τ (3.29)
For components voted MooN system, contribution of CCF and independent failure for PFD
is calculated from
PF HCC FMooN ≈CMooN ·β ·λDU ; (M <N ) (3.30)
PF HMooN 2 ≈CMooN ·β ·λDU + N !
(N −M +1)! · (M −1)! [(λDU ·τ)
N−M+1/τ] (3.31)
Remark: It is assumed that the diagnostic test is done with the intervals of length τ1. If DD
failure and Proof Test Coverage (PTC) are taken into consideration in PFH calculation. The new
PFH formula given by Jin (2013) is shown in the footnote.
2PF H ≈ λDλDU ·
(
C(n−k+1)oon ·β ·λDU + n!(n−k)! ·
[
((1−PTC )·λDUτ1)k
k !τ1
)+PTC ·λDU ·∑kj=1 [(1−PTC )·λDUτ1]k− j (λDUτ) j−1(k− j+1)! j ! ])
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Figure 3.1: CMooN factors for different voting logics
3.5 Common approach by HEF
The common approach by calculating hazardous event frequency (HEF) is introduced in Jin
(2011). This common approach is based on the Markov model in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Markov transition diagram for HEF common approach
Kolmogorov forward equations can be expressed below(Rausand and Høyland (2004)):
P (t ) · A = P˙ (t ) (3.32)
The state transition matrix A = ai j is based on the non-zero entries, which means:
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State 5: Available (non-demand) State 4: Safe state (N/A)
State 3: Functioning (on-demand) State 2: DD failure (non-demand)
State 1: DU-failure (non-demand) State 0: Dangerous failure (on demand)
Table 3.1: System states for HEF common approach
ai i =−
5∑
j=0
ai j , j 6= i f or i = 0,1, · · · ,5. (3.33)
The irreducible Markov process is shown as:
Li m
t→∞Pi (t )= Pi (t )= const ant f or i = 0,1, ...,5 (3.34)
Li m
t→∞P˙i (t )= 0 f or i = 0,1, ...,5 (3.35)
Sum of the steady state probability equals to 1. Each state probability can be calculated in
Equation 3.32 Equation 3.34 and Equation 3.35.
5∑
i=0
Pi = 1 (3.36)
HEF at time t is equal to the visit frequency to state 0 from any other state at time t:
HEF (t )=
5∑
i=1
Pi (t ) · Ai 0 (3.37)
The calculation HEF formula is equal to
HEF (t )= P1(t ) ·λde +P2(t ) ·λde +P3(t ) ·λD (3.38)
3.6 Common approach by MTTH
Another common approach is to calculate Mean time to failure (MTTH) based on Markov dia-
gram (Figure 3.3). This common approach as "Integrated SIL allocation" is presented by SIEMENS
in Safecomp 2006 (Braband (2006)). A proposal for a harmonised SIL Table as an unambiguous
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Figure 3.3: Mean time to hazard markov diagram
SIL determination method is mentioned as well (See Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Proposal for a Harmonised SIL Table based on MTTH (Adapted from Braband (2006))
Index denotes the initial state3. Based on the Markov Diagram in Figure 3.3. Mean time to
hazard (MTTH) is calculated below:
MT T H00 = 1
λ+λS
+ λ
λ+λS
MT T H01+ λS
λ+λS
MT T H10 (3.39)
For initial state MT T H01
MT T H01 = 1
µ+λS
+ µ
µ+λS
MT T H00 (3.40)
For initial state MT T H10
MT T H10 = 1
λ+ 2T
+
2
T
λ+ 2T
MT T H00 (3.41)
3Detailed description of each state in Markov Diagram in Figure 3.3 hasn’t been given in Braband (2006)
Chapter 4
Case study subsea high integrity pressure
protection system
This assessment of the case study is based on the example of High Integrity Pressure Protection
System (HIPPS) described and presented in the ISO13628-14 (2011). The PDS method is used as
the calculation method in this case study. Typically, HIPPS is a low demand system. Typical high
demand systems in subsea are rare, in this case, in order to compare the choice between low
and high demand mode, it is assumed that HIPPS can also operate in high/continuous demand
mode. Both PFD in low demand and PFH in high demand operational mode are calculated and
compared.
4.1 Description of HIPPS
Figure 4.1: Subsea high integrity pressure protection system
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HIPPS is called High Integrity Pressure Protection System. It protects against overpressure in
pipelines or vessels by quickly isolating the source causing the overpressure. As shown in Figure
4.1, the overpressure source appears in section one which include but not limited to: high reser-
voir pressures, subsea pumps, and connection to higher pressure pipeline. The source could
be gas, liquid or multiphase fluid (ISO13628-14 (2011)). Common demand scenarios could be
closed valve, hydral plug leads HIPPS to function. HIPPS is a typical safety instrumented system
and a custom-built product which the main functionality is specified by the customer. The loca-
tion of HIPPS is installed topside or subsea on an X-mas tree, manifold or pipeline end terminal
(Figure 4.1). Typically, a SIL 3 requirement is placed on the HIPPS safety function (i.e., shut off
to isolate over pressurization in the flow line).
Figure 4.2: A simple HIPPS architecture (Adapted from Signoret (2008), Fiorentini (2010))
As shown in Figure 4.2, a standard High Integrity Pressure Protection System comprises of:
• Pressure transmitters
• Logic solver(s)
• Solenoid-operated hydraulic control valves
• Fastclosing shutdown valves
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4.2 Assumptions and Failure data of HIPPS
Assumptions of reliability assessment of High Integrity Pressure Protection System are described
below (PDS (2013)):
• All failure rates are assumed to be constant with respect to time, i.e., the time to failure is
exponentially distributed.
• The elements considered are identical and have the same constant failure rates.
• It is assumed that the component is as good as new after the repair and functional test.
• The demand rate is assumed to be constant, ie., the time between demands is exponen-
tially distributed.
• Failures occur independently and their severities are constant over time.
• PFD and PFH are calculated as average values.
• Standard β factor model is used to model common cause failures.
• In low demand mode, the time between diagnostic self-tests is assumed significantly lower
than the time between demands.
• When giving the "simple" formulas for PFH, the contribution from unavailability due to
repair and testing of components is not included; ie., short MTTRs are assumed.
• For single (1oo1) component systems, the system is immediately put in a safe state upon
detection and repair of a dangerous detected failure. DD failure affecting all N redundant
components of a system will upon detection immediately result in the system going to a
safe-state. In these simplified formulas, DD failures are ignored and PFH equals the rate
of the DU failures.
• The term λDU ·τ should be small enough to allow e−λDU ·τ≈1−λDU ·τ, i.e., λDU ·τ≤ 0.2
• The rate of independent DU failures is throughout approximated with λDU (Rather than
e.g., using (1−β)λDU for 1oo2)
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• For N ≥ 3, we ignore the contribution of a combination of single and double failures.
• The self test period is "small" compared to the interval between functional testing, i.e., at
least a factor 100 lower.
• The formulas given here do not account for demands as a means of testing to detect dan-
gerous failures.
• It is assumed that PF HA and PF HB are small enough: 1-(1-PF HA)(1-PF HB )≈PF HA+PF HB
Table 4.1: Generic reliability data for the HIPPS components (Adapted from PDS (2013))
Relevant failure data of reliability assessment of High Integrity Pressure Protection System
are from PDS handbook and are shown in Table 4.1, the appropriate test interval τ is assumed
to be one year (8760 hours).
4.3 Assessment of HIPPS for both low and high demand mode
4.3.1 Fault tree analysis and reliability block diagram
The purpose of fault tree analysis and reliability block diagram in this chapter is to visualize the
logic structure of the system in the analysis. CARA Fault Tree version 4.0 (c) SINTEF 1996 is uti-
lized for fault tree analysis. The fault tree relating to the HIPPS appears in Figure 4.3. The safety
function “Failure to isolate over-pressurization in flowline” can be represented by a reliability
block diagram as shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Fault tree for subsea high integrity pressure protection systems
Figure 4.4: Reliability block diagram for subsea high integrity pressure protection systems
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4.3.2 PDS calculation for low demand operation
In this reliability assessment, Probability of failure on demand(PFD) is calculated by PDS method
which is introduced in Chapter 3.4. Contributions from the common cause failures of Pressure
Transmitter, Logic Solver and Valves are calculated below:
PF DCC FPT (2oo3) =C2oo3 ·β ·λDU ·τ/2= 2 ·0.06 ·0.5 ·10−6 ·8760/2= 2.63×10−4 (4.1)
PF DCC FLog i c(1oo2) =β·λDU ·τ/2= 0.03·(0.04·10−6+0.03·10−6+0.04·10−6)·8760/2= 1.4×10−5 (4.2)
PF DCC FV al ve(1oo2) =β ·λDU ·τ/2= 0.05 ·1.9 ·10−6 ·8760/2= 4.16×10−4 (4.3)
Individual contributions in HIPPS can be expressed as:
PF D i nd .PT (2oo3) = (λDU ·τ)2 = (0.5 ·10−6 ·8760)2 = 1.92×10−5 (4.4)
PF D i nd .Log i c(1oo2) = (λDU ·τ)2/3= [(0.04 ·10−6+0.03 ·10−6+0.04 ·10−6) ·8760]2/3= 3.1×10−7 (4.5)
PF D i nd .V al ve(1oo2) = (λDU ·τ)2/3= (1.9 ·10−6 ·8760)2/3= 9.23×10−5 (4.6)
The total probability of failure on demand is calculated below:
PF D tot al = PF DSensor s +PF DLog i cSol ver s +PF DF i nal Element s = 8.05×10−4 (4.7)
The probability of failure on demand of High Integrity Pressure Protection System calculated
by PDS method is 8.05 ×10−4. Comparing the PFD figure with the SIL table presented in Figure
2.3, the system is classified as a SIL 3 system (Figure 4.5), as the calculated PFD is less than 10−3
and greater than 10−4.
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4.3.3 PDS calculation for high demand operation
Probability of dangerous failure per hour(PFH) is calculated by PDS method, which is intro-
duced in Chapter 3.4. Contributions from common cause failures of Pressure Transmitter, Logic
Solver and Valves are calculated below:
PF HCC FPT (2oo3) ≈C2oo3 ·β ·λDU ≈ 2×0.06×0.5×10−6 ≈ 6×10−8 (4.8)
PF HCC FLog i c(1oo2) ≈C1oo2 ·β ·λDU ≈ 0.03× (0.04+0.03+0.04)×10−6 ≈ 3.3×10−9 (4.9)
PF HCC FV al ve(1oo2) ≈C1oo2 ·β ·λDU ≈ 0.05×1.9×10−6 ≈ 9.5×10−8 (4.10)
Individual contributions in HIPPS can be expressed as:
PF H i nd .PT (2oo3) ≈ 3 · (λDU ·τ)2/τ= 3 ·λ2DU ·τ= 3× (0.5×10−6)2×8760≈ 6.57×10−9 (4.11)
PF H i nd .Log i c(1oo2) ≈ (λDU ·τ)2/τ=λ2DU ·τ= (0.11×10−6)2×8760≈ 1.06×10−10 (4.12)
PF H i nd .V al ve(1oo2) ≈ (λDU ·τ)2/τ=λ2DU ·τ= (1.9×10−6)2×8760≈ 3.16×10−8 (4.13)
The total probability of dangerous failure per hour is calculated below:
PF Htot al = PF HSensor s +PF HLog i cSol ver s +PF HF i nal Element s = 1.97×10−7 (4.14)
The probability of dangerous failure per hour of High Integrity Pressure Protection System
calculated by PDS method is 1.97×10−7. Comparing the PFH figure with the SIL table presented
in Figure 2.4, the system is classified as a SIL 2 system, as the calculated PFH is less than 10−6
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and greater than 10−7. The common cause contribution PF HCC F is an essential contributor to
the PF HTot al , as PF HCC F has already reached SIL 2. Common cause failures should therefore
be paid particular attention (Figure 4.6).
Remark: Requirements in the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 related to qualitative aspects (manage-
ment of functional safety/avoidance and control of systematic failures) and architectural con-
straints requirements have not been considered as part of the thesis work.
4.4 General SIL allocation problem in IEC 61508
In IEC61508 (2010) and IEC61511 (2010). Three types of methods of determine SIL requirements
are introduced:
• General quantitative method
• Semi-Quantitative (Risk Graph, Layer of Protection Analysis)
• Qualitative (Hazardous event severity matrix)
In SIL allocation, safety integrity levels for both demand modes can be decided directly in
Risk graph, LOPA and Hazardous event severity. However, resulting contradictions in safey in-
tegrity level appear by different PFD and PFH calculations. This problem can be traced back and
discussed in general quantitative method in IEC 61508-5.
Figure 4.7: Safety integrity allocation - Example for safety-related production system.(Adapted
from IEC61508 (2010))
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The general quantitative method uses PF Dav g as the only calculation example in IEC 61508-
5 Page 28 to demonstrate SIL allocation. The Ft is the tolerable hazard frequency and Fnp is the
demand rate on the safety-related protection system. Basic steps are described below:
1. Determine the tolerable risk (e.g., from ALARP)
2. Determine the EUC risk.
3. Determine the necessary risk reduction to meet the tolerable risk.
4. Allocate the necessary risk reduction to the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technol-
ogy safety-related systems and other risk reduction measures (IEC 61508-1 7.6).
5. Determine the probability of failure on demand for the safety-related protection system
(PF Dav g ) to meet the necessary risk reduction (∆R). For a constant consequence in the
specific situation described, PF Dav g = (Fp /Fnp ) = ∆R. (Fp is the risk frequency with the
protective features in place.)
6. For PF Dav g = (Fp /Fnp ), the safety integrity level can be obtained from Table 4.2 of IEC
61508-1
Table 4.2: SIL allocation problems in IEC 61508
The SIL requirements is determined by the risk reduction factor which is independent of
low and high/continuous demand mode. In general SIL allocation method step five, PF Dav g
is calculated first by formula PF Dav g = (Fp/Fnp) = ∆R. The average of probability of failure on
demand (PF Dav g ) is used to allocate the low demand SIL range in the left part1 of Table 4.2. If it
is needed to find out the high/continuous demand mode SIL range, then the SIL table is switch
1Only the left hand table has a unit-less column (PF Dav g )
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to the right part which seems to be a rather arbitrary calibration. Probability of dangerous failure
per hour (PF H) in high demand is decided based on SIL allocated by PF Dav g (Figure 4.2). By
definition and calculation in Chapter 2.2.7, there are many differences between low demand
and high demand operation. It is inappropriate to determine SIL for high demand based on
PF Dav g which is a measurement for low demand system. Safety integrity levels could result in
contradictions.
4.5 SIL calibration
The SIL range in right hand part in Table 4.2 for high/continuous demand mode of operation is
arbitrarily calibrated, making it inappropriate for use. The results from case study have demon-
strated the inconsistent safety integrity level result. In this section, Matlab is used to carry out
SIL calibration and find out the general correction factor to propose a better calibration of the
SIL table. Ideally, the general correction factor is hoped to provide a consistent calibration
regime and this will be further tested in Matlab in Chapter 5.2. αn and βn is defined as the
equivalent upper limit of low demand and high demand safety integrity level in Table 2.3 and
Table 2.4:
αn = 10−n βn = 10−(n+4) (4.15)
When the total probability of failure of demand is calculated. θ is used to express the ratio
between the upper limit of low demand system and PFD:
θ = αn
PF Dhi pps
(4.16)
Adjustment ratio is the θ multiply with PFH then divide high demand SIL upper limit:
ε= θ · PF Hhi pps
βn
= αn ·PF Hhi pps
PF Dhi pps ·βn
(4.17)
In Figure 4.8, it is assumed the ε equals to one if the safety integrity levels are consistent. If
the safety integrity levels are inconsistent, corrected range for high demand is expressed below:
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αn+1
PF Dhi pps
×PF Hhi pps ≤ SI LPF Hcor r ectedn <
αn
PF Dhi pps
×PF Hhi pps (4.18)
Final average correction factor ∆ is
∆=
∑n
1 εn
n
(4.19)
The complete simulation calculation process is shown in Figure ??. Detailed explaination
are given as comments behind the Matlab code in Appendix B. SIL calibrations are carried out
by varying both failure rate and CCF. The original failure rate in Figure 4.1 is expanded by 10
from 10−8 to 10−6. As shown in Figure 4.3 the range between maxium and minimun is 102.
The beta factor range for common cause failure is from 1 percent to 15 percent. Therefore beta
factor has been expanded by 100.477 = 3, the range between maxium and minimun is 100.954 = 9
in Figure 4.4. Both variables follow logarithmic scale in the plotting graphic. This makes it easy
to compare those values which cover a large range. The suitable test interval for low and high
demand system in the simulation is assumed from one month to one year.
Table 4.3: Reliability data for SIL calibration by varying failure rates
Table 4.4: Reliability data for SIL calibration by varying beta factors
Matlab calculates the average correction factor by carrying out 4016000 times calculation.
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Figure 4.8: Flow chart for the proposed simulation method for SIL calibration
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The SIL calibration results are listed in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: SIL calibration results
Plotting graphics are generated and given below. The test interval τ has critical influences on
the correction rate compared with the failure rates and beta factors. When the safety integrity
levels are consistent, the correction rate is assumed to be 1. If SIL is inconsistent, the correction
range will gradually close to the range from IEC 61508 when test interval increases. However,
test interval less than 8760h (1 year) would be meaningful for high demand system. All the
adjustment will be significant since the correction rate will not be less than 2 when test interval
is equal to one year. There is almost one level adjustment (correction factor is around 10) for SIL
when test interval is around 2 to 3 months.
Figure 4.9: Correction factor ε plotting by varying failure rates
New safety integrity level table with correction ranges2 is given in Table 4.6:
2The correction factor ∆ is used as 5.7, since two correction rates calculated above in the simulations are quite
close with this value. The SIL consistency of this range is further discussed and tested in Chapter 5.2.
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Figure 4.10: Correction factor ε plotting by varying beta factors
Figure 4.11: Ratio between upper limit and PFD θ by varying failure rates
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Figure 4.12: Ratio between upper limit and PFD θ by varying beta factors
Table 4.6: New safety integrity level correction ranges
Chapter 5
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
5.1 Conclusions and discussions
All the objectives in the master’s thesis set in Chapter 1.3 are aimed to be met with the utmost
possible effort. The literature review has been performed in Chapter 2.3. IEC 61508, IEC 61511,
and the OLF guideline OLF 070 are introduced. The existing mathematical models for low and
high demand reliability calculation are summarized in Chapter 3. In the literature review, math-
ematical model and theoretical framework section, special attention has been paid on the dif-
ferences between high and low demand mode of operation. Relevant industry standard and
guidlines are summarized in Table 2.2. Related works in other industries are found out to be few,
this is also partly due to limited access to other industries. The main frameworks for reliability
assessment for both high demand, and low demand mode of operation have been illustrated
and compared through subsea HIPPS case study in Chapter 4.3 and mathematical models for
reliability calculation in Chapter 3. The differences in architectural constraints are presented
and compared in Chapter 2.2.6. The case study is performed and is used as basis for the SIL
calibration approaches in Chapter 4. The approach both with respect to implications for stan-
dardization work, and for the company have been concluded. The discussions on both the issue
of SIL allocation, and reliability assessment have been covered.
PDS method introduced in Chapter 3 has been used as the reliability assessment method in
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the case study. The probability of failure on demand of High Integrity Pressure Protection Sys-
tem calculated by PDS method is 3.7×10−4. Compared to the values presented in SIL in Figure
2.3, it is concluded that the safety function is within safety integrity level 3, as the calculated PFD
is less than 10−3 and greater than 10−4.
The probability of dangerous failure per hour of HIPPS calculated by PDS method is 1.77×
10−7. Compared to the values presented in SIL in Figure 2.4, it is concluded that the safety
function is within safety integrity level 2, as the calculated PFH is less than 10−6 and greater
than 10−7. Typically, a SIL 3 requirement has been allocated to the subsea HIPPS by the oil
companies in the subsea industry. Therefore in high demand operation, safety integrity target
has not been met. The results in case study in terms of SIL are found out to be inconsistent. This
problem is discussed and traced back to the general quantitative SIL allocation method in IEC
61508-5. The thesis therefore attempts to develop a general consistent SIL range by carrying out
SIL calibriations with Matlab. New correction factor is calculated to be 5.7. A new SIL table is
given in Table 4.6.
The differences in safety integrity levels are mostly caused by inconsistency in SIL ranges for
low and high demand mode in Table 4.2. Although this could be due to safety considerations
when the system is operating in high demand mode, but no explanations are found to support
this either in IEC 61508 or other literatures. Another reason is that PFH and PFD are calculated
in different formulas. The relationship between the PFD and PFH in PDS handbook is shown in
Equation 5.1.
PF DMooN ≈ PF H i nd .MooN ·τ/(N −M +2)+PF HCC FMooN ·τ/2(M <N ) (5.1)
The distinguishing frequency once per year in IEC 61508 is not reasoned and arbitrary(PDS
(2013), Jin (2011)). Also the ranges in SIL Table 4.2 for both low demand and high demand lack
consistency and may lead to contradictions. Therefore choosing different demand mode will
lead to different results. Example could be Automatic train protection system(ATP). The demand
rate often depends on the reliability of the human operator (acting as a control system) and the
operation profile, so it may be argued that the ATP system is both a low demand system and a
continuous mode system (Braband (2006)).
Another problem is that various elements have different demand rates for different SIFs.
CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY 51
This will make it hard to define the mode of operation. Example could be logic solver may op-
erate more than the input and final elements. Lastly, the classification in IEC 61508 disregards
the aspect of the demand duration. Example could be blow-out preventer (BOP) which is used
to stop uncontrolled flow from oil wells during drilling. BOP as a safety instrumented system is
in low demand mode between demands. But when it is rarely activated to full closure, BOP will
withstand the well pressure for hours and weeks in high demand operation mode. No reliability
measures are able to deal with this situation (Jin (2011)).
5.2 Decisions on following IEC 61508 SIL tables
There are two directions for High Integrity Pressure Protection System to achieve safety integrity
level 3 both in low and high demand mode based on whether follow IEC 61508 SIL table or not .
Choosing to follow IEC 61508 SIL table means the reliability of HIPPS operating in high de-
mand mode needs to be improved to meet SIL 3. More costs will get involved. However, there
are also disadvantages to adopt the common approach or new SIL correction ranges. The aver-
age mean value used as the general correction factor for the new SIL table could be question-
able. The failure rates and beta factors don’t have much influences on this value. However, the
average correction rate depends greatly on the test interval range 1 chosen to be used in the
simulations. In Figure 5.1, the consistency of safety integrity level has been tested 2. By expand-
ing the SIL range for high demand system, the safety integrity levels become more consistent as
shown in the figure. However the approaches to correct the SIL table for IEC 61508 and give the
general correction rate confront challenges. Choosing to use PFD calculation for low demand
and close to high demand system would be one of the recommended solutions. For the com-
mon approach, HEF would be hard to link with safety integrity level and the proposed MTTH
SIL ranges have not been tested or supported.
1The SIL calibration uses non-conservative test interval range from 1 month to 1 year, possible test interval range
could be, for example, 3 month to 4 month.
2In Matlab, if SIL is consistent the value in plotting is set to be 1, else is 0.
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Figure 5.1: Safety integrity level consistency testing
Figure 5.2: Decisions on following IEC 61508 SIL tables or not
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• Keep following IEC 61508 SIL tables, the decisions could be:
– Reduce the common cause failures (Main contributions)
– Increase redundancy (More spurious trips)
– Add protection layers
– Reduce test interval
– Improve reliability of the components
• Not to follow IEC 61508 SIL tables:
– Use new safety integrity level correction ranges in Table 4.6.
– Use PFD calculation for low demand and close to high demand systems.
– HEF method as common approach (Hard to link with SIL)
– Mean Time to Hazard (MTTH) (No literatures are found to support the new proposed
MTTH SIL ranges)
5.3 Recommendations for further work
Future works could be performed in several directions:
• Investigating in the cost caused by lack of consistency in IEC 61508 SIL ranges.
• Link the HEF method with safety integrity level.
• Study on the applicability of proposed MTTH SIL ranges.
Appendix A
Acronyms
CCF Common Cause Failure
DD Dangerous Detected
DU Dangerous Undetected
ESD Emergency Shutdown
EUC Equipment under control
FTA Fault tree analysis
FTF Fail to function
HWFT Hardware Fault Tolerance
IEC International Eletrotechnical Commission
KooN K out of N system
OREDA Offshore reliability data
OLF The Norwegian Oil Industry Association
PFH Probability of failure per hour
PFD Probability of failure on demand
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PDS Norwegian for "Reliability of Computer-based Safety Systems"
PT Pressure Transmitter
RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
RFF Risk reduction factor
RBD Reliability block diagram
SIS Safety-instrumented systems
SFF Safe failure fraction
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SOV Solenoid Valve
SRS Subsea Requirements Specification
SIL The Safety integrity level
ST Spurious trip
MTTF Mean time to failure
MTTR Mean time to repair
Appendix B
Matlab Code
1 %This i s the Matlab code for the Master t h e s i s : Choice of demand mode for
subsea systems%
2
3 clear a l l ;
4 close a l l ;
5
6 %Definit ions for the f ixed value and variables for calculat ions%
7
8 %Beta f a c t o r s for the common cause f a i l u r e s%
9 beta1 =0.06;
10 beta2 =0.03;
11 beta3 =0.05;
12
13 %CCF configuration f a c t o r s − Cmoon%
14 C1oo2=1;
15 C2oo3=2;
16
17 nr =1000; %This defines the i n t e r v a l s for lamda_du%
18
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19 %DU f a i l u r e rates are defined as variables which follow Logarithmic scale .
This makes i t easy to compare values which cover a large range%
20 %A l l the DU f a i l u r e s are separated nr times . A l l DU f a i l u r e s follow the
same pace with nr%
21 lamda_du1=logspace (−7.301 ,−5.301 , nr ) ;
22 lamda_du2=logspace (−8.3979 ,−6.3979 , nr ) ;
23 lamda_du3=logspace (−8.5223 ,−6.5229 , nr ) ;
24 lamda_du4=lamda_du2 ;
25 lamda_du5=logspace (−6.7212 ,−4.7212 , nr ) ;
26
27 %Test i n t e r v a l s for high demand system are from 730hrs (1 month) to 8760hrs
(12 months)%
28 tau =730:2:8760;
29
30 %Calculations%
31 for i =1: length ( tau )
32 for j =1: length ( lamda_du1 )
33
34 %Low demand operation mode%
35 PFD1=C2oo3* beta1 *lamda_du1 ( j ) . * tau ( i ) . / 2 ; %CCF Pressure transmitters%
36 PFD2=beta2 . * ( lamda_du2 ( j ) +lamda_du3 ( j ) +lamda_du4 ( j ) ) . * tau ( i ) . / 2 ; %CCF
Logic Solvers%
37 PFD3=beta3 *lamda_du5 ( j ) . * tau ( i ) . / 2 ; %CCF Final Elements%
38
39 PFD4=(lamda_du1 ( j ) . * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ;%PFDind for Pressure transmitters%
40 PFD5= ( ( ( lamda_du2 ( j ) +lamda_du3 ( j ) +lamda_du4 ( j ) ) . * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / 3 ;%PFDind
for Logic Solvers%
41 PFD6=( ( lamda_du5 ( j ) * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / 3 ;%PFDind for Final Elements%
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43 PFD=PFD1+PFD2+PFD3+PFD4+PFD5+PFD6 ; %Total probabi l i ty of f a i l u r e on demand
%
44
45 SIL_ZE=−log10 (PFD) ; %SIL equalient value for t o t a l PFD%
46 SIL= f l o o r ( SIL_ZE ) ; %Safety i n t e g r i t y l e v e l for the system%
47 EUB=10.^(−SIL ) ; %Equivalent upper l i m i t%
48 RATE( i , j ) =EUB. /PFD; %Ratio Upper/PFD%
49
50 %High demand operation mode%
51 PFH1=C2oo3* beta1 *lamda_du1 ( j ) ; %CCF Pressure transmitters%
52 PFH2=C1oo2* beta2 * ( lamda_du2 ( j ) +lamda_du3 ( j ) +lamda_du4 ( j ) ) ; %CCF Logic
Solvers%
53 PFH3=C1oo2* beta3 *lamda_du5 ( j ) ; %CCF Final Elements%
54
55 PFH4=(3*( lamda_du1 ( j ) * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / tau ( i ) ; %PFHind for Pressure
transmitters%
56 PFH5= ( ( ( lamda_du2 ( j ) +lamda_du3 ( j ) +lamda_du4 ( j ) ) . * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / tau ( i ) ; %
PFHind for Logic Solvers%
57 PFH6= ( ( lamda_du5 ( j ) * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / tau ( i ) ; %PFDind for Final Elements%
58
59 PFH=PFH1+PFH2+PFH3+PFH4+PFH5+PFH6;%Total probabi l i ty of dangerous f a i l u r e
per hour%
60
61 EUBL=10.^(−SIL−4) ; %Equivalent high demand SIL upper l i m i t in IEC 61508%
62
63 i f (PFH>=EUBL/10 & PFH<=EUBL)
64 DELTA( i , j ) =1;
65 else DELTA( i , j ) =0;
66 end
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67 %Used to t e s t the consistency of s a f e t y i n t e g r i t y l e v e l in both low and
high demand modes%
68
69 i f (PFH>=EUBL/10 & PFH<=EUBL)
70 EUL=EUBL;
71 else EUL=PFH. * RATE( i , j ) ;
72 end
73 %Test the consistency of SIL , i f not give a new high demand SIL upper
l i m i t based on RATE( i , j )%
74
75 RATE2( i , j ) =EUL. /EUBL; %SIL correction rate%
76 TAU( i , j ) =tau ( i ) ;
77 NR( i , j ) = j ;
78
79 end
80 end
81
82 nnr= i * j %Total calculat ion times%
83 sum(sum(RATE2) ) /nnr %Average SIL correction rate%
84
85
86 mintau=min(min(TAU) ) ;
87 maxtau=max(max(TAU) ) ;
88 minnr=min(min(NR) ) ;
89 maxnr=max(max(NR) ) ;
90 t o t a l n r = i * j ;
91 meanrate=sum(sum(RATE) ) / t o t a l n r ;
92 meanrate2=sum(sum(RATE2) ) / t o t a l n r ;
93 mx=[minnr minnr maxnr maxnr ] ;
94 my=[mintau mintau maxtau maxtau ] ;
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95 [MY,MX]= meshgrid (mx,my) ;
96 MR=ones ( 4 ) *meanrate ;
97 MR2=ones ( 4 ) *meanrate2 ;
98 surf (MX,MY,MR2)
99 shading interp
100 alpha ( 0 . 5 ) ;
101 hold on
102 surf (TAU,NR, RATE2)
103 shading interp
104 %Plot the SIL correction rate and the average SIL correction value%
105
106 mesh(TAU,NR, RATE)
107 shading interp
108 %Plot the Rate ( i , j )%
109
110 mesh(TAU,NR,DELTA)
111 shading interp
112 %Used to t e s t the consistency of SIL in both operation modes%
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1 %Matlab code for common cause f a i l u r e s e n s a t i v i t y case study%
2 clear a l l ;
3 close a l l ;
4
5 %Definit ions for the f ixed value and variables for calculat ions%
6
7 %CCF configuration f a c t o r s − Cmoon%
8 C1oo2=1;
9 C2oo3=2;
10
11 %Dangerous undetected f a i l u r e rates%
12 lamda_du1=0.5/1 e6 ;
13 lamda_du2=0.04/1e6 ;
14 lamda_du3=0.03/1e6 ;
15 lamda_du4=lamda_du2 ;
16 lamda_du5=1.9/1 e6 ;
17
18 nr =1000; %This defines the i n t e r v a l s for beta f a c t o r s%
19
20 %Beta f a c t o r s are defined as variables which follow Logarithmic scale .
This makes i t easy to compare values which cover a large range%
21 %A l l the beta f a c t o r s are separated nr times . A l l values follow the same
pace with nr%
22
23 beta1=logspace (−2.222 ,0.222 , nr ) ;
24 beta2=logspace (−2.523 ,0.523 , nr ) ;
25 beta3=logspace (−2.301 ,0.301 , nr ) ;
26
27 %Test i n t e r v a l s for high demand system are from 730hrs (1 month) to 8760hrs
(12 months)%
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28 tau =730:2:8760;
29
30 %Calculation for the r e s u l t s%
31 for i =1: length ( tau )
32 for j =1: length ( beta1 )
33
34 %Low demand operation mode%
35 PFD1=C2oo3* beta1 ( j ) *lamda_du1 . * tau ( i ) . / 2 ; %CCF Pressure transmitters%
36 PFD2=beta2 ( j ) . * ( lamda_du2+lamda_du3+lamda_du4 ) . * tau ( i ) . / 2 ; %CCF Logic
Solvers%
37 PFD3=beta3 ( j ) *lamda_du5 . * tau ( i ) . / 2 ; %CCF Final Elements%
38
39 PFD4=(lamda_du1 . * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ; %PFDind for Pressure transmitters%
40 PFD5= ( ( ( lamda_du2+lamda_du3+lamda_du4 ) . * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / 3 ; %PFDind for Logic
Solvers%
41 PFD6=( ( lamda_du5* tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / 3 ; %PFDind for Final Elements%
42
43 PFD=PFD1+PFD2+PFD3+PFD4+PFD5+PFD6 ; %Total probabi l i ty of f a i l u r e on demand
%
44
45 SIL_ZE=−log10 (PFD) ; %SIL equalient value for t o t a l PFD%
46 SIL= f l o o r ( SIL_ZE ) ; %Safety i n t e g r i t y l e v e l for the system%
47 EUB=10.^(−SIL ) ; %Equivalent upper l i m i t%
48 RATE( i , j ) =EUB. /PFD; %Ratio Upper/PFD%
49
50 %High demand operation mode%
51 PFH1=C2oo3* beta1 ( j ) *lamda_du1 ; %CCF Pressure transmitters%
52 PFH2=C1oo2* beta2 ( j ) * ( lamda_du2+lamda_du3+lamda_du4 ) ; %CCF Logic Solvers%
53 PFH3=C1oo2* beta3 ( j ) *lamda_du5 ; %CCF Final Elements%
54
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55 PFH4=(3*( lamda_du1* tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / tau ( i ) ; %PFHind for Pressure transmitters%
56 PFH5= ( ( ( lamda_du2+lamda_du3+lamda_du4 ) . * tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / tau ( i ) ; %PFHind for
Logic Solvers%
57 PFH6= ( ( lamda_du5* tau ( i ) ) . ^ 2 ) . / tau ( i ) ;%PFDind for Final Elements%
58
59 PFH=PFH1+PFH2+PFH3+PFH4+PFH5+PFH6; %Total probabi l i ty of dangerous f a i l u r e
per hour%
60
61 EUBL=10.^(−SIL−4) ; %Equivalent high demand SIL upper l i m i t in IEC 61508%
62
63 i f (PFH>=EUBL/10 & PFH<=EUBL)
64 EUL=EUBL;
65 else EUL=PFH. * RATE( i , j ) ;
66 end
67
68 RATE2( i , j ) =EUL. /EUBL;
69 TAU( i , j ) =tau ( i ) ;
70 NR( i , j ) = j ;
71
72 end
73 end
74
75 mesh(TAU,NR, RATE)
76 shading interp
77 %Plot the Rate ( i , j )%
78
79 mesh(TAU,NR, RATE2)
80 shading interp
81 %Plot the SIL correction rate%
Appendix C
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Figure C.1: Correction rate ε plotting by varying failure rates
Figure C.2: Correction rate ε plotting by varying failure rates
APPENDIX C. PLOTTING RESULTS 66
Figure C.3: Correction rate ε plotting by varying failure rates
Figure C.4: Correction rate ε plotting by varying failure rates
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Figure C.5: Ratio between upper limit and PFD θ by varying failure rates
Figure C.6: Ratio between upper limit and PFD θ by varying failure rates
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Figure C.7: Correction rate ε plotting by varying beta factors
Figure C.8: Correction rate ε plotting by varying beta factors
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Figure C.9: Correction rate ε plotting by varying beta factors
Figure C.10: Correction rate ε plotting by varying beta factors
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Figure C.11: Ratio between upper limit and PFD θ by varying beta factors
Figure C.12: Ratio between upper limit and PFD θ by varying beta factors
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